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Bong Hits and Big Money: How the
Roberts Court Turns Free Speech "On Its
Head"
Jessica Davist
On the morning of January 24, 2002, the Olympic torch was
carried through the streets of Juneau, Alaska, en route to the
winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah.' Juneau-Douglas High
School let its students out early to enjoy the event, and they lined
both sides of the street, scuffling, joking around, and waiting for
the torch to come by.2 As it did, Senior Joseph Frederick and a few
of his friends "unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase:
'BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.'"3
A few months before the congressional elections of 2004, an
anti-abortion group ran a radio advertisement called "Wedding."4
The ad envisioned a couple at the altar, with the father of the
bride interrupting the ceremony to talk about how to put up
drywall.5 This ad and others entitled "Loan"6 and "Waiting"7
exhorted Wisconsin voters to contact their incumbent senators to
oppose the filibuster of judicial nominees with the tagline,
t. J.D. expected 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1996,
University of Wisconsin. I would like to express my appreciation for the guidance
given to me by Professor Heidi Kitrosser as well as Law and Inequality: A Journal
of Theory and Practice, especially Nora Sandstad, Lizzie Smith, Mary Boatright,
and Sara Sampsell-Jones and her editing staff. Additionally, I would like to thank
my father Michael Davis for instilling in me a passion for civil rights, equality, and
politics (beginning at age two months, watching the resignation of Nixon together
on the sofa), and my mother Elisabeth Bridge for encouraging me to follow in her
footsteps to pursue a career in law.
The title of this article quotes Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2699 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting), arguing that
the majority opinion inverts the reasoning of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2007).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2661 n.2.
7. Id. at 2660 n.3.
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"sometimes it's just not fair to delay an important decision."8
What do these two scenarios have in common? On the same
summer day of June 25, 2007, the United States Supreme Court,
newly under the direction of Chief Justice John Roberts, released
two opinions that addressed these two sets of facts. 9 In Morse v.
Frederick,° the Court found that, given a government interest in
preventing drug abuse among minors, the school could forbid
Frederick's banner." In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc.,2 the Court determined that, while Congress
has a compelling interest in stamping out electoral corruption,13
campaign finance reform laws could not place limits on the timing
of "Wedding" and its sister issue ads because they did not
expressly advocate for one candidate or another." Therefore, the
Court found that the ads could "not possibly" contribute to the
problem of political corruption."1
While grounded in different precedent, both Morse and
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. address free speech issues governed
by the First Amendment of the Constitution." Stripped of the
special circumstances governing school speech on the one hand
and campaign speech on the other, together, the two cases stand
for the striking proposition that a political organization can speak
more powerfully than a natural person in the contemporary
America.
How did the Court come to this result? In these cases, the
Court employed precedent selectively, picking the cases it wished
to rely on and distinguishing those that did not fit-to preserve
the speech rights of the moneyed but deny the same rights to the
unimpowered." The Court relied on these special circumstances
to frame the issues in the respective cases in initial terms that
necessitated their end results. By focusing on the individual facts
of cases and ignoring the purpose of the First Amendment, the
Court missed the forest through the trees.18
8. Id. at 2660.
9. See id. at 2652; Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2618 (2007).
10. 127 S. Ct. 2618.
11. Id. at 2625.
12. 127 S. Ct. 2652.
13. Id. at 2672.
14. Id. at 2673.
15. Id. at 2672-73.
16. Id. at 2673; Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
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This Article maintains that the Court was wrong in finding
for the speaker in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. but not for the
speaker in Morse; the speech rights of an individual should not be
constrained when those of a state-created, moneyed organization
are allowed to run rampant. The Roberts Court used precedent
formalistically to preserve the speech rights of powerful political
groups and to deny them to the unimpowered, thereby flouting the
greater purpose of the First Amendment. This Article focuses on
the Court's treatment of campaign electioneering in Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., and it highlights Morse to show the Court's
inconsistent and disturbing treatment of individuals' versus
political organizations' speech rights. Part I of this Article
discusses the Court's historical approach to free speech
jurisprudence, notes the special circumstances carved out for
different kinds of speech, and reviews the history of both school
and campaign speech law. Part II shows that the Court's
formalistic reasoning led to erroneous conclusions in Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. It also shows that in Morse the same pattern
was used to reach paradoxical results. Part III posits a different
view of free speech rights that, if adopted, could reconcile the
inconsistencies in the Court's interpretation of free speech rights
for different parties. It further demonstrates how adoption of
these views would resolve the problematic subversion of individual
rights to those of political organizations.
I. The First Amendment Introduced
A. The History of Free Speech
Despite its founding-day origins, the Court did not address
the issue of free speech in earnest until the twentieth century. 19
The first cases to address the constitutionality of limits on
expression largely focused on the rights of politically active
individuals and relatively small groups of such individuals;" thus,
19. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (2d ed. 2003) (noting
that the Supreme Court did not give serious attention to the issue of freedom of
speech until the early-twentieth century).
20. See David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 237, 237-38 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (noting that
the labor movement was a main actor in promoting free speech laws); see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 357-58 (1927) (finding that a man who
attended meetings of Communist Labor Party was guilty of "criminal syndicalism");
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (holding that incendiary
pamphlets tossed to factory workers about the use of the munitions they produced
violated the law); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1919) (holding that
anti-draft leaflets sent to potential draftees violated the law).
2008]
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the speeches of the soapbox speaker came to epitomize what
should be protected."'
As such, the right to free speech was that of the citizen
against government action-providing what some have termed a
"shield," protecting the autonomous right to speak against the
unconstitutional intrusion of the government.' In this context,
the Court would come to find that the speech of individuals
generally is protected from government interference regardless of
content, unless it falls within a rather large group of enumerated
exceptions.23 Otherwise, the content of the message is, in principle
at least, ignored.
In addition to actual speech, conduct that can communicate a
message ("symbolic speech") is generally protected. For instance,
the burning of the flag, though highly offensive to many
Americans, has been deemed protected. 24 Likewise, the spending
of money to disseminate a message has been equated with speech
and, subject to certain restrictions, is also protected. 2
In many decisions over the years, the Court upheld "content-
neutral"26 laws, but it struck down laws that discriminated against
viewpoints27 and expanded the definition of "free speech" to further
open the "marketplace of ideas."" More speech was necessarily
better since it contributed to the back-and-forth of democratic
21. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1408 (1986) ("For the most part, the Free Speech Tradition can be understood as a
protection of the street corner speaker.").
22. See id. ("[T]he First Amendment is conceived of as a shield . . . protecting
the individual speaker from being silenced by the state."); Gregory P. Magarian,
The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental
Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 110 (2004)
("[T]he First Amendment affords a formal, negative shield against government
action that limits any speech. .. ").
23. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-85 (1992) (noting that
content-based regulations are presumptively invalid but that some categories of
speech, such as obscenity, defamation, and "fighting words," can be regulated
because of limited social worth).
24. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (citing Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) for the proposition that flag burning is
protected expressive conduct).
25. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
26. See Farber, supra note 19, at 21-38 (discussing the content distinction
approach to First Amendment doctrine).
27. See id. at 21-38.
28. See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money:
Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation,
58 MERCER L. REV. 949, 964-65 (2007) (stating that Justice Brennan, concurring in
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965), was the first justice to write
about John Stewart Mill's "market place of ideas").
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debate.29 This urge to widen the bounds of protected discourse
naturally resulted in the extension of First Amendment
protections to state-created entities, such as corporations.
30
In the 1940s, the Court determined that corporate speech in
the form of advertising was not protected by the First
Amendment; 3' however, the Court set out a new path in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,32 holding that it was not the identity of the speaker but the
speech itself that was determinative. 3  As an initial matter, the
Court found that the economic motivations of actors do not
necessarily remove their speech from the sphere of free speech
protection.34 Additionally, given the free-market nature of the
economy, the Court held advertising to be in the public interest
because it informs the public of its choices.3" However, commercial
speech will be subject to government regulation where there is a
substantial countervailing interest at play.36 Because it is the
speech that is protected, not the speaker, corporations can even
perform the "speech act" of spending money without an overt self
interest-including spending money on political speech.37
B. Regulation of Speech
Certain categories of speech, such as obscenity, fighting
words, and libel, are "unprotected speech."" As a general rule,
content-based restrictions on speech are prohibited. 39 Content-
neutral restrictions, on the other hand, are generally permissible if
they, for example, regulate the time, place, and manner of the
29. See Shi-Ling Hsu, What Is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the
Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75, 108-09 (2005) (noting that both
advocates and detractors of campaign finance reform appear to endorse the idea
"that more speech is always better").
30. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (establishing
speech rights for corporate bodies and holding that the worth of speech does not
depend on the identification of the speaker).
31. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
32. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
33. Id. at 761-62.
34. Id. at 762.
35. Id. at 764.
36. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
37. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
38. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("[Some] areas
of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) ...




[T]here seems to be two clearly established exceptions to the
rule of content neutrality, and at least one other possible
exception .... One exception.., is for compelling government
interests .... A second well-established . . . exception covers
speech with some nexus to government operations .... A third
... may cover regulations with a sufficiently long historical
pedigree.
1. School Speech
Balancing students' rights with the government interest in
developing an educated and law-abiding citizenry42 has always
marked school speech as a niche area of First Amendment law.
Here, speech is limited as it is in other state-run, custodial
institutions, such as prisons and the military." Although public
school students had spectacularly few constitutional rights until
the genesis of First Amendment jurisprudence in the early-
twentieth century, 4 the ensuing years resulted in some freedoms
in the speech acts allowed to public school students, but recently,
also some curtailments thereof.
a. Precedent: Tinker, Fraser, Kulmeier, and
Vernonia
The strongest statement of First Amendment protection for
student speech came in the context of Vietnam War protest.45 In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,' a
group of students were suspended for wearing black armbands to
school in protest against the Vietnam War.47 The Warren Court
recognized the "need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
40. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
("Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.").
41. FARBER, supra note 19, at 32-33.
42. Anthony B. Schutz, Public School Restrictions on 'Offensive' Student Speech
in Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000): Has
Fraser's 'Exception' Swallowed Tinker's Rule?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 443, 444 (2002)
(noting "ongoing struggle" to balance rights and interests).
43. FARBER, supra note 19, at 193.
44. See supra Part L.A (discussing early history of free speech); see also David L.
Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts' Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel
v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 183
(2002) ("For most of the Twentieth century, public school students possessed little,
if any, free-speech protections.").
45. Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 44, at 185-86.
46. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
47. Id.
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constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools."' 8  It also held that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate"49  and that the "vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools."" The Court noted that the
students' actions were not disruptive and not of the type that
would "intrude . . .upon the work of the schools or the rights of
other students,"5' and it noted that the school district's actions
were taken because it wanted to "avoid . . .controversy.",2 As
such, the Court held that to justify an action to stifle student
speech, a school "must be able to show that its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint""
rather than just an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance." ' As the school district had made no such showing,
its actions were found unconstitutional. 5
If Tinker was the apex of student speech rights, the 1986 case
of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser6 may well have been its
nadir (prior to the 2007 Morse decision). Fraser concerned a
speech given by a high school student at an assembly in which he
employed "an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor"
that spurred on "hoot[ing] and yell[ing]" in the crowd, as well as
obscene gestures; some students were apparently embarrassed or
confused by the speech.17 The Court, under Chief Justice Burger,
upheld the student's suspension, expressly distinguishing Tinker,
which it noted concerned symbolic speech that did not interfere
with school work or infringe on the rights of other students.
Asserting that the speech was not only "lewd and obscene"9 but
also "plainly offensive,"" the Court stated that it is "[slurely ... a
highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit
48. Id. at 507.
49. Id. at 506.
50. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
51. Id. at 508.
52. Id. at 510.
53. Id. at 509.
54. Id. at 508.
55. Id. at 514.
56. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
57. Id. at 678.
58. Id. at 680 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 683.
20081
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the use of vulgar and offensive terms"6  and that "the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults .... 6 Thus,
the Court held, fairly broadly, that "[tihe determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board."'
Two other noteworthy cases in considering the speech issues
raised in Morse: Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier' and
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton."' In Kuhlmeier, the Court
addressed the censorship of student-written articles on teen
pregnancy in a school-sponsored newspaper.' The Court
expressly distinguished the case from Tinker, stating that
Kuhlmeier did not deal with barring expression per se, but rather
with whether a school must "affirmatively . . . promote" student
speech.67 The Court held that a school may control speech that
"the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school."' Vernonia was not a free speech case at all, but
rather it dealt with Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment concerns,
to wit, the mandatory drug testing of student athletes.9
Importantly, the Court recognized that deterring drug use is an
"important-indeed, perhaps compelling" interest of the state,7°
and that in the narrow factual situation presented, drug testing
was constitutional.71
b. Morse v. Frederick
The Principal of Juneau-Douglas High School Deborah Morse
suspended Joseph Frederick for displaying a banner that read
"BONG HiTS FOR JESUS" at a school-sponsored event.7 ' She
61. Id.
62. Id. at 682.
63. Id. at 683.
64. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
65. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
66. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262-65.
67. Id. at 270-72.
68. Id. at 271.
69. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 648-52.
70. Id. at 661.
71. Id. at 665.
72. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007). Frederick's counsel
attempted to argue that, as an optional activity off of school property, Frederick's
speech should not be considered school speech. See Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-
008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *5 (D. Alaska May 29, 2003). Every court,
however, held that it was a school speech case. See id.; Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622;
Morse v. Frederick, 434 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006).
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said she did this because she interpreted the banner to promote
illegal drug use in violation of school policy, 3 which "specifically
prohibits any assembly or public expression that ... advocates the
use of substances that are illegal to minors.74 Frederick
administratively appealed the suspension through school district
processes, but the superintendent of schools ultimately upheld
Principal Morse's decision because Frederick's banner contained a
"message promoting drug usage in the midst of a school activity."75
According to the superintendent, the message was not political
speech because it did not "advocat[e] the legalization of
marijuana."7 Moreover, the banner was "potentially disruptive to
the event and clearly disruptive of and inconsistent with the
school's educational mission" to dissuade drug use."
For his part, Frederick asserted that he "had been
increasingly bothered by the lack of attention to the issue of
freedom of speech in the United States generally and at [his high
school] in particular."" At one point, he had been told by an
assistant principal that he would be suspended if he did not stand
for the Pledge of Allegiance." Further, Frederick stated: "Bong
Nits 4 Jesus was never meant to have any substantive meaning.
And it was certainly not intended as a drug or religious
message."0
Justice Roberts's majority opinion, however, did not discuss
Frederick's concern for First Amendment rights; rather the
opinion claimed that "the best Frederick [could] come up with is
that the banner [was] 'meaningless and funny"'81 and that his goal
was to get on television.82 Moreover, the Court asserted that his
motivation was of no consequence, as what truly mattered was
that the banner could plausibly be interpreted as displaying a pro-
drug message.'
73. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622-23.
74. Id. (quoting Juneau School Board Policy number 5520).
75. Id. (quoting the Juneau School District Superintendent).
76. Id. (quoting the Juneau School District Superintendent).
77. Id. (quoting the Juneau School District Superintendent).
78. Respondent's Brief at 1-2, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No.
06-278), 2007 WL 579230.
79. Id. at 2 n.1.
80. Justice Talking: Does Free Speech Stop at the Schoolhouse Door? (National
Public Radio Broadcast Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Justice Talking] (transcript
available at http://www. justicetalking.org/transcripts/070430_bonghits-transcript.
pdf).





The Court accepted the superintendent's argument that this
was not political speech and that the school had more than a "mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness . . . of an
unpopular viewpoint," and thereby it distinguished the case from
Tinker." The Court further found that Fraser stood for two
principles: students in school do not have constitutional rights on
par with those of adults,8 and, since the Fraser Court allegedly
"did not conduct the 'substantial disruption' analysis prescribed by
Tinker," the requirement of a "substantial disruption" is not
necessary in all instances to uphold school action in controlling
student speech.8
The Court cited Vernonia for the notion that deterring drug
use by schoolchildren is an "'important-indeed, perhaps
compelling' interest"87 and that drug use poses a danger "far more
serious and palpable"88 than the danger at issue in Tinker.8" The
Court reasoned that-in light of this compelling interest cited by
the school district, to which the Court should accord deference-the
actions taken by Principal Morse were justified; since she
reasonably interpreted the banner as promoting illegal drug use in
violation of school policy, she could prevent the dissemination of
its message.9
2. Campaign Speech
The Supreme Court has also found that the government has
an interest in regulating speech pertaining to campaigns for
political office.9 The basis for this assertion of power is found in
the Constitution.9  Additionally, such speech pertains to a
84. Id. at 2626 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2627.
87. Id. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661
(1995)).
88. Id. at 2629.
89. Id. The Tinker Court found the school was motivated by a desire to avoid
unpleasant disputes. Id. at 2626 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2007)
(discussing the important governmental interest in preventing campaign
corruption); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) ("[Tlhe government may adopt
reasonable . . . regulations . . . in order to further an important governmental
interest unrelated to the restriction of communication.").
92. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
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government activity, and the government has a greater interest in
regulating the dissemination of information relating to
electioneering than it would, say, in regulating speech purely
concerning political issues.93
When the government attempts to control speech concerning
political issues, the courts are quick to declare such regulation to
be a control of content and therefore unconstitutional. 4  The
government's efforts have been largely limited to controlling
purely political speech-i.e., "vote for X." 5 The difficulty is that
speech concerning political issues and speech meant to promote a
candidacy often overlap, making it difficult to draft legislation that
both is effective and withstands the test of constitutionality.
Another issue the courts have faced is the act of spending
money to fund speech-whether in the form of a contribution or an
expenditure.' They have found spending money to fund speech to
be protected as a "speech act."97 At the same time the Court has
expressed concern about the spending by corporations,
organizations, and other non-natural individuals, and the impact
that such "immense aggregations of wealth"9 can have on the
political process.99 However, while the state may also have a
viable interest in preventing the distortion of speech-that is, that
the speech of the moneyed will drown out that of individual
citizens-the courts have largely rejected that concern and instead
recognized a significant interest in controlling corruption and the
appearance thereof. 10
a. Precedent: Buckley, Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Austin and McConnell
In 1907, Congress began regulating monetary contributions
93. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (noting
that the state can legitimately limit campaign expenditures by corporations to
prevent unfair elections but cannot prevent corporations from expressing political
views).
94. See FARBER, supra note 19, at 29 ("[The Court] disapproves most intensely
of viewpoint discrimination.").
95. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-44; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 249 (1986).
96. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-47. "Expenditures" are monies spent on
behalf of a candidate-i.e., advertisements paid for and run by a third party. Id.
"Contributions" are funds given to a candidate. Id.
97. See id. at 51.
98. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
99. See, e.g., id.; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115-22 (2003).
100. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-49.
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by corporations to elections;"' in later years, that regulation was
extended to contributions made by labor unions. 0 2  While such
entities could not give money directly from their general purpose
treasuries, they could establish political action committees
("PACs"), which are highly regulated, segregated funds set aside
for the purpose of political advocacy. 3 The Federal Election
Campaign Act ("FECA") of 19710 was enacted in an attempt to
close a loophole exploited by groups that, unable to donate money
directly and unwilling to submit to the regulations imposed by the
PAC system, chose to make expenditures on behalf of
campaigns.'°5  While maintaining the distinction between
expenditures and contributions, FECA imposed limits on both."°6
FECA limited the amounts of allowable expenditures and
contributions, and it also mandated disclosure of information
concerning the nature of both. 11
7
The constitutionality of FECA was challenged in Buckley v.
Valeo."' In that decision, the Court first held that political
contributions and expenditures are speech, not conduct, and they
are therefore protected by the First Amendment. 9 Further, any
regulation of these "speech acts" must be closely drawn to fit the
government interest in reducing corruption and appearance of
corruption in federal elections."' Notably, FECA defenders had
argued that the law was in the public interest since it would
equalize the voices of the moneyed with those of ordinary
citizens."' The Court was openly hostile to this suggestion,
stating "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voices of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.""'
While upholding FECA's limitations on contributions
generally,"' the Court rejected some of the Act's provisions
101. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2690 (2007).
102. See id. .
103. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401-04
(1972).
104. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000)).
105. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2690-91.
106. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 16.
110. Id. at 25-26.
111. Id. at 48.
112. Id. at 48-49.
113. Id. at 46-47. The Court distinguished contributions from expenditures,
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governing expenditures.1 1 4  Of special note is that it rejected a
provision placing a dollar limit on expenditures concerning a
clearly identified candidate. "5  However, the Court was still
concerned that "the distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may
often dissolve in practical application,""6 and it sought to avoid the
hindrance of pure issue advocacy since that would pose a
"significant encroachment on First Amendment rights."" 7
Therefore, the Court limited the disclosure requirement to
expenditures on advertisements that "include explicit words of
advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate," "8 such as ".vote for,'
'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' . . . 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
[and] 'reject.'" 9 These words would come to be known as the
infamous "magic words" marking an ad as advocacy."12
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life,"' the Court again confronted the issue of expenditures. 2'
The Court addressed an instance where the name of a candidate
was not directly tied to such magic words; instead, the
advertisement urged readers to vote pro-life in an upcoming
election and then listed the names of pro-life candidates.' The
Court noted that its purpose in Buckley was to "distinguish
discussion of issues and candidates from more pointed
exhortations to vote for particular persons,"" ' and it held that,
since this ad was only "marginally less direct" than a blatant
message of "vote for X" of the latter category,1 5 it was subject to
the FECA disclosure requirements." 6
Massachusetts Citizens for Life dealt with issues concerning
disclosure as well as the legality of expenditures, whereas in
approving of limits on the former because donations to a candidate do not limit the
contributor's ability to speak per se; moreover, the Court recognized that a quid pro
quo between a candidate and a donor, whether actual or merely perceived, was not
in the interest of the democratic system. Id.
114. See id. at 51, 54, 58.
115. Id. at 51.
116. Id. at 42.
117. Id. at 64.
118. Id. at 43.
119. Id. at 44 n.52.
120. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007) (referencing
the Buckley "magic words").
121. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 243 (1986).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 249.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 249-50.
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Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,'27 the Court limited
itself to the question of the constitutionality of state limitations on
expenditures. 128 It upheld a Michigan law prohibiting nonprofit
corporations that accepted donations from for-profit corporations
from making campaign expenditures directly from their
treasuries. 129  While distinguishing its holding from that in
Massachusetts Citizens for Life-in part based on the nature of the
organization intending to expend funds' 3 -the Court for the first
time found a compelling state interest in controlling the "corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas."13' Since the Michigan law was not an absolute ban
on spending because corporations could still legitimately use PACs
for expenditures, it was narrowly tailored to serve this interest.
132
Further, the law was held to be an apt resolution of a valid
concern that corporations could circumvent state regulation of
funds by donating to nonprofit organizations, which could then
make campaign expenditures. 1
3
However well-intentioned FECA may have been, as Justices
Stevens and O'Connor later noted, "[m]oney, like water, will
always find an outlet." 134 In 2002, Congress took steps to address
the new ways that organizations were getting around campaign
finance limits and other rules.'3 ' The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act ("BCRA")136 strengthened FECA in several ways, but of
special importance to this discussion is Section 203 of the BCRA.
That section prohibited any incorporated body from using general
treasury funds to pay for an "electioneering communication."
37
127. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 652 (1990).
128. Id. at 654.
129. Id. at 668-69.
130. Id. at 662-64. Massachusetts Citizens for Life was a pro-life organization
with the express purpose of advocating for political change, and it did not accept
donations from business corporations. Id. In Austin, the group intending to make
expenditures was a chamber of commerce, comprised in large part of corporations
and with interests that included the economic benefit of its constituent business
members. Id.
131. Id. at 660.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 664-65.
134. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
135. See id. at 132-33.
136. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81.
137. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189. The BCRA amended FECA's original
disclosure requirements for individuals by extending those requirements to
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The constitutionality of the BCRA and its specific provisions
concerning electioneering communications were addressed by the
Court in its lengthy decision in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission.'38 The electioneering communications provision was
challenged because, some maintained that, Buckley had drawn "a
constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-
called issue advocacy, and.., speakers possess an inviolable First
Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech."'39
The Court rebuffed this attack, noting that the limitation to
express advocacy in Buckley was "the product of statutory
interpretation rather than a constitutional command" "" meant to
avoid problems of overbreadth and vagueness.' Declining to
draw a bright line between express advocacy and so-called issue
advocacy, the Court noted that "the presence or absence of magic
words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from
a true issue ad."' The Court found that Buckley's express
advocacy line "has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or
apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the
flaws that it found in the existing system."
4 3
The Court also noted that the definition of an electioneering
communication under the BCRA was "both easily understood and
objectively determinable," 4 and it in no way raised Buckley
vagueness concerns. The court held that "the issue ads broadcast
during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and
general elections are the functional equivalent of express
advocacy" 4' and that the "justifications for regulation of express
advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those periods if the ads
are intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that
effect." 4 6 As such, the Court determined that the law on its face
was constitutional. 47
However clear the McConnell Court was about the facial
constitutionality of the BCRA provision governing electioneering
corporations and unions and including all "electioneering communications." Pub.
L. No. 107-155, §§ 201-04, 116 stat. at 88 (2002).
138. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132-34.
139. Id. at 190.
140. Id. at 191-92.
141. Id. at 192.
142. Id. at 193.
143. Id. at 193-94.
144. Id. at 194.





campaigning, in a footnote to the opinion the majority noted that
"the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might
not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads."" While this
language could be considered mere dictum, this footnote
ultimately opened the door to an "as-applied" challenge.
b. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. ("WRTL"), a nonprofit
corporation149 that accepted corporate donations5 0 sought to run
ads that exhorted Wisconsin citizens to contact their Democratic
Senators Russ Feingold and Herb Kohl to tell them to "oppose the
filibuster" of judicial nominees. 5 ' These ads were to run less than
thirty days prior to the election for Senate in which Feingold was
running as incumbent, were directed at voters in his district, and
clearly named Senator Feingold."5 ' Therefore, these ads met the
definition of "campaign electioneering" per the BCRA.' WRTL
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to run the ads, suing the
Federal Election Commission ("FEC") in federal court.1
A federal district court denied the injunction, stating that
McConnell left "no room for the kind of 'as applied' challenge
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. propound[edl." " ' On appeal, the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court, stating
that McConnell in fact did not preclude such a challenge and,
therefore, review of the BCRA as applied to the ads in question
could take place.'56 On remand, the lower court took the Supreme
Court's decision to mean that it must limit its review to the "four
corners" of the ads, and in so narrowly construing its mandate,
concluded that the ads were not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy but rather "genuine issue ads."'57 The FEC and
intervenors appealed to the Supreme Court, which set the matter
for briefing and argument. "
In analyzing the merits of the challenge, the Court first noted
148. Id. at 206 n.88.
149. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2007).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2660-61.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 2660, 2698 n.13.
154. Id. at 2661.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2662.
158. Id.
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that, regardless of whether the ads were issue ads or express
advocacy, the ads necessarily constituted political speech." 9 Being
political speech, strict scrutiny must apply, and the government
had to prove that the BCRA was narrowly tailored to protect a
compelling interest.6 ° McConnell had held that in the context of
express advocacy the BCRA required strict scrutiny.16 ' The
question here was whether WRTL's ads constituted express
advocacy or its functional equivalent, thereby falling within its
purview.' 2
The Court found that the ads constituted neither express
advocacy nor its functional equivalent." The FEC argued that
McConnell held that "the issue ads broadcast during the 30- and
60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are
the functional equivalent of express advocacy" and that "[t]he
justifications for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally
to ads aired during those periods if the ads are intended to
influence the voters' decisions and have that effect."" Yet, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that "McConnell's analysis was grounded in
the evidentiary record before the Court,"65 and he said that
McConnell did not require a test for determining whether an ad
was the functional equivalent of express advocacy.16  Roberts
further asserted that Buckley had precluded the test that some
maintained had been articulated by McConnell by rejecting an
"intent-and-effect" test, and thus any test that depended on a
speaker's intent would be invalid.'67 The Court then developed its
own test: "a court should find that an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate."" Applying this new test to the ads
at bar, the Court held that the ads' content was "consistent with
that of a genuine issue ad" in that they focused on an issue and
asked the public to contact their representative about that issue,
159. Id. at 2663-64 (noting that the ads were within the scope of BCRA's
application to political speech).
160. Id. at 2664.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2655.
164. Id. at 2664 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205-06 (2003)); see
supra text and accompanying notes 145-46.
165. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2664.
166. Id. at 2665.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 2667.
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did not overtly mention an election, and did not expressly address
the fitness of a candidate for office. 169
The Court refused to accept the argument of the FEC and
intervenors that the context of the ads demonstrated that the ads
were indeed the functional equivalent of express advocacy because
the Court had already designed a new test that expressly ignored
intent and effect. 7 ' Thus, that the ads purported to be concerned
with votes on judicial nominees but did not coincide with those
votes, and instead coincided with an election, was found to be of no
consequence.'7 Likewise, the Court considered the following facts
irrelevant: the ads ostensibly urged voters to contact Feingold,
they failed to provide any contact information for him, and they
instead listed a website that expressly urged voting against
Feingold."7' What mattered to the Court was that the ads could
possibly be construed as issue ads, not express advocacy. Stating
that "[wihere the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to
the speaker, not the censor,"73 the Court held that the interest in
protecting speech that may be interpreted as something other than
express political advocacy dictated that any ad susceptible of an
"issue ad" interpretation be given the benefit of the doubt, and
therefore be deemed not to be the functional equivalent of express
advocacy. 1
74
Having determined that the ad was not express advocacy or
the functional equivalent thereof, the Court went on to apply strict
scrutiny.' The Court considered whether the government's
interest was compelling and, if so, whether the BCRA was
narrowly tailored to address that interest. "' This question was
easily answered: since only express advocacy would give rise to
what the Court had deemed to be a compelling interest (i.e.,
concerns about corruption or the appearance thereof), and these
ads were not express advocacy or its equivalent, the government
naturally could have no interest in regulating these ads.'77
169. Id.
170. See id. at 2669 (stating that, based on the new standard, these contextual
issues should seldom play a role in the inquiry).
171. See id. at 2668 (stating that running the ads near an election is
unremarkable).
172. Id. at 2668-69.
173. Id. at 2669.
174. See id. at 2669 ("Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because
the issue may also be pertinent in an election.").
175. Id. at 2671.
176. Id. at 2672.
177. Id. at 2671. Austin's recognition of a compelling interest in the impact on
elections of "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth"
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Although it found the BCRA as applied to be
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion did not purport to
overrule McConnell. However, seven of the nine justices
interpreted the opinion as overruling McConnell. In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia urged that it would have been better to
overrule the holding even in the face of stare decisis.'78 In his
dissent, Justice Souter opined that "the principal opinion
institute[s] the very same standard that would have prevailed if
the Court formally overruled McConnell" and therefore, McConnell
was effectively overruled.'79
II. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. and Morse: Defining Terms
to Meet Set Ends
In both Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. and Morse, the Court
began with certain premises that necessitated the resulting
holdings. Those premises were questionable at best, and perhaps
biased. Upon determining that Morse was not a case of political
speech, the Court determined that the Tinker protections did not
extend to Frederick. Under a new test that it created wholesale,
the Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. Court held the BCRA
unconstitutional as applied to the ads in question. The facts in
these cases and the relevant precedent did not logically lead to
either determination. Rather, the Court used faulty initial
assumptions to extrapolate erroneous conclusions. By defining the
contours of the question, the Court reached conclusions that are
troubling, especially because they are of the ilk typified by
"conservative" Courts in the past."18 Given the new constitution of
the Roberts Court,"' it would be reasonable to suspect that the
and its impact on elections was dismissed on the same basis. Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
178. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2687 (Scalia, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. See generally Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Decisional Trends on the
Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73
JUDICATURE 103 (1989) (empirically comparing decisions of the Warren and Burger
Courts in terms of conservative versus liberal). The Burger Court is considered to
be a "conservative" Court, whereas the Warren Court is considered "liberal." Id.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. ignores McConnell, harkening back to Burger's Buckley
opinion. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2672. Morse supersedes the logic
in Warren's Tinker opinion in favor of Burger's Fraser opinion. See Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007).
181. See John F. Basiak, The Roberts Court and the Future of Substantive Due
Process: the Demise of "Split-the-Difference" Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV.
861, 864 (2007). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito have replaced
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, respectively. Justice O'Connor was
often considered the "swing vote." Id.
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assumptions were borne at least in part in the hope of creating
new law-a conservative twist on judicial activism. 8' Indeed,
those not in the majority in both cases asserted that the Court's
holdings were either a perversion of precedent or actually an
overruling of it.'
A. The Faulty Logic in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
Congress designed the BCRA to close a loophole that had
previously allowed corporations and unions to directly run ads
that advocated a stance in an election without using "magic words"
of express advocacy, such as "vote for" or "elect X." 84 While an ad
that used such words was clearly express advocacy, by avoiding
those "magic words," it was possible to disguise an ad intended to
advocate as an "issue ad."' As such, corporate and union
advocates could pay for ads directly from their treasuries and
circumvent the PAC requirement by avoiding such overt calls to
vote for or against a candidate. 8
The BCRA clearly defines what "campaign electioneering"
was curtailed under the law.'87 Per the BCRA, 1) a "broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication" 2) that clearly identifies a
candidate for federal office, 3) is targeted to the voters in that
candidate's district and 4) runs within a set span of time prior to
an election may not be funded through corporations' general
treasuries. 8
The McConnell Court approved of the BCRA definition,
finding it easily understood, objective, and constitutional as
applied to express advocacy or its functional equivalent. 89 Per
McConnell, advocacy would constitute such a functional equivalent
if it "intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that
effect.""' However, Chief Justice Roberts opined that McConnell
182. See Seth Rosenthal, Fair to Meddling: The Myth of the Hands-Off
Conservative Jurist, SLATE, June 27, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2144202/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2008) (arguing that Justices Roberts and Alito are not, in fact,
hands-off jurists but are rather judicial activists).
183. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
("IT]his faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation . . ."); id. at 2699 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("McConnell's holding... is overruled.").
184. See id. at 2695 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 2693.
187. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
188. Id.
189. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204-05 (2003) (finding no distinction
between express advocacy and "so-called issue advocacy").
190. Id. at 206.
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had been limited to the abstract question of whether the BCRA
could prohibit a certain type of ad and denied that the case had
established a standard that could be applied to actual ads, such as
those at bar.'9
Strangely, even as the Court stated that McConnell was an
analysis of an abstract question of constitutional law, it asserted
that the McConnell analysis was "grounded in the evidentiary
record" presented in that case."' As the dissent noted, the Chief
Justice cited no authority for this assertion other than WRTL's
brief in the case and a misrepresentation of McConnell's appellate
record.'93 But, by making this unsupported assertion, Justice
Roberts was able to supersede McConnell's intent-and-effect test
for determining if the ad is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy. He went back to the 1976 decision in Buckley-the very
decision that created the "magic words" loophole that the
McConnell Court expressly plugged when it upheld most of the
BCRA.'94 In stating that Buckley and not McConnell governed,
Roberts cited the former for the proposition that an intent-and-
effect test would not provide a safe harbor for free speech because
a subjective determination of what constituted advocacy would
subject some genuine issue ads to restrictions.'9' With a broad
sweep of the pen, Chief Justice Roberts effectively overruled the
plain McConnell endorsement of an intent-and-effect test even as
he purported to uphold the decision.'99
Having disposed of precedent, Roberts continued by pulling a
new test for determining the functional equivalent of express
advocacy out of thin air." '  Addressing the appropriate
191. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2661 (noting the Supreme Court's
prior holding that McConnell "did not purport to resolve future as-applied
challenges").
192. Id. at 2664.
193. Id. at 2700 n. 18. In McConnell v. FEC, District Court Judge Henderson did
not herself assert that the core evidence in the case was the studies cited; rather,
she quoted this assertion in passing, saying that "[aiccording to the [studies'
proponents] the . .. reports were 'the central piece of evidence marshaled by
defenders of [BCRA.]" 251 F. Supp. 2d 307, 308 (D.D.C. 2003). The Chief Justice
therefore misrepresented the record to the degree that he used this quote without
noting that it itself was a quote, not a judicial finding. See id.
194. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003) (explaining that a rigid
border should not be defined for these ads).
195. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2665 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 43 (1976)).
196. Indeed, all Justices other than Roberts and Alito noted that McConnell is
effectively overruled. See opinions cited supra note 183.
197. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Chief Justice's test is contrary to McConnell).
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considerations for such a test, he said that it must provide a safe
harbor for free expression, and it should "reflec[t] our 'profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.""9 His new test
would focus on the content of the ad rather than on "amorphous"
considerations of intent and effect." He then pronounced that an
ad was to be considered the functional equivalent of express
advocacy only if "susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal" to vote in a certain way."
If the analysis of so-called "issue ads" is limited to their four
corners, virtually no ads would be determined to be the functional
equivalent of express advocacy because they are specifically
designed to avoid magic words. Therefore, regardless of their true
purpose or effect, they necessarily could be interpreted as
something other than express advocacy."0 ' Indeed, McConnell
explained that ads that refrain from explicitly exhorting the
electorate to vote for a particular candidate are considered to be
more effective than those that do.2"2 Even if an organization was
not trying to circumvent campaign law, the organization may in
fact prefer to cloak its advocacy as an issue ad. If an ad appears to
advocate for an issue rather than for or against a candidate, it
seems more credible to viewers.2 "' Effective as these ads are, they
have become endemic, and they are the very evil that the BCRA
had attempted to root out.204  By overruling McConnell and
creating a new test that does not look at intent or effect, the
Roberts Court in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. has effectively
returned the nation to the Buckley days, thwarting the will of
Congress to address a compelling public need."'2
It is clear that the ads in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. fell
under the BCRA standard. They mentioned a candidate, were
directed toward the appropriate audience of voters, were run
during the blackout period, and were funded through WRTL's
198. Id. at 2665 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
199. Id. at 2666.
200. Id. at 2666 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 2702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 127 (2003) (outlining the record
relating to persuasiveness of ads).
203. See id.
204. See id. at 193 (establishing that similar criteria governs ads with and
without magic words).
205. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2702 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that the BCRA was enacted to stop the need for magic words).
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treasury, not its PAC."° However, they did not contain the magic
phrase "vote against Feingold," and so, under the new Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. test, the ads did not constitute the functional
equivalent of express advocacy. But looking beyond form to intent
and effect, it is clear that WRTL's aim was to encourage Wisconsin
citizens to cast a vote against Russ Feingold."7
The ads concerned the filibuster of judicial nominees-an
issue that was not of pressing concern at the time of the proposed
airing because Congress was in recess, and therefore no nominees
were up for approval. °8  The Senate election was of pressing
concern at the time. WRTL's ads were clearly attempting to
influence votes, not weigh in on an issue."9 Additionally, the ads
told voters to contact Senator Feingold to encourage him to refrain
from filibustering, but they gave no contact information for him.210
Instead, the ads gave WRTL's website address, which contained
plainly partisan messages exhorting voters to vote against the
Senator. 1' Only by looking to context can the true nature of a
political ad be discerned.212 One would expect context to be of
special importance in an as-applied challenge, such as Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. Roberts noted that the line between issue ads
and advocacy is often fuzzy," 3 yet nonetheless blithely chose to
ignore the reality that these ads were of the latter ilk. He effected
his purpose to overcome the BCRA by creating a test that ignores
context entirely. This was a formalistic analysis that perverted
precedent and reality, thereby thwarting the will of Congress. It
can only be called judicial activism.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. recognized that the state has a
compelling interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
thereof. 4 It further recognized that a restriction on political
speech can be implemented only if it is narrowly tailored to further
a compelling interest.21 Notably, it also asserted that the Court
saw no reason to regulate ads that are issue ads, i.e., "that are
206. Id. at 2660-61 (majority opinion).
207. Id. at 2697-98 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing WRTL's public views on
candidates).




212. See id. at 2702 (arguing that context is central to the meaning of an ad).
213. Id. at 2659 (majority opinion).
214. Id. at 2672.
215. Id. at 2671.
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neither express advocacy nor its functional equivalent." 16 But
why would it? Pure issue ads are not meant to sway voters
towards a particular candidate; they discuss issues, not elections.
However, Roberts erroneously found that WRTL's ads were issue
ads."7 The necessary conclusion is that the state can have no
compelling interest in regulating those ads. Having created a
formalistic test that no electioneering communication guised as an
issue ad could fail to pass, all such issue ads are no longer
considered advocacy. 18 The state has no interest in regulating ads
that are not advocacy, and thus the BCRA provisions are
unconstitutional when applied to virtually all ads.2 '9  Roberts
defined his terms and neatly fit them to his ends.
This was all too much for Justice Souter who, in a seething
dissent, stated that the new test "stands McConnell on its head."2 6
Justice Souter noted that the dicta in McConnell allows for the
possibility of 'genuine' or 'pure'" issue ads to which an application
of the BCRA may be unconstitutional.22  Justice Souter stated
that the McConnell Court "meant that an issue ad without
campaign advocacy could escape the restriction."22 2  It is not
whether an ad is capable of interpretation as an issue ad that is
determinative, but rather, whether it is capable of interpretation
as advocacy.223 If an ad can take on this meaning, it is not
"genuine" or "pure;" McConnell dictates whether the application of
the BCRA to such an ad is constitutional.224 While Justice Souter
agreed with the Chief Justice in interpreting case law to mean
that the state has a compelling interest in regulating the
functional equivalent of express advocacy, 22' he rejected Roberts's
asserted need for a new test, and therefore used the McConnell
impact-and-effect test.2 26  Considering the contextual factors
surrounding the ads at bar, Justice Souter concluded that the
WRTL ads were the functional equivalent of advocacy, of the sort
216. Id.




220. Id. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206-07 (2003)).
225. See id. at 2696 (stating that it was understood that there was a compelling
interest in limiting electioneering by corporations and unions).
226. See id. at 2701-02.
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that the state had a compelling interest in regulating.22
Per the dissent, state concerns about corruption and
resultant voter cynicism and apathy were well-founded.228 Justice
Souter gave a primer on the lengthy history of executive and
legislative concerns about and attempts to control corruption by
regulating campaign financing, emphasizing that this has been an
endemic problem that had only worsened over the years.2 9 He
went on to cite empirical studies showing the public felt its votes
have little if any importance.2 0 For instance, most voters believe
that their representatives will more often vote in the interest of
those who donate to (or, presumably, make expenditures on behalf
of) their campaigns rather than for the interest of their
constituencies.231 Additionally, he noted that Austin recognized
another valid interest in campaign regulation: controlling the
"corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas."32
The BCRA was narrowly tailored to meet the interest for
which it was enacted. As the dissent notes, even with the BCRA
limitations groups would have a wealth of options by which they
could communicate their messages."' If a group wanted to run an
ad during the blackout period, it could do any number of things to
legitimize that action. It could pay for the ad through its PAC." 4
It could run it in media other than television.23 And, if an ad was
truly an issue ad, its sponsors could simply refrain from
mentioning any candidate. 3 6 Alternatively, if a group wanted an
ad to advocate for or against a candidate, run on television, and be
paid for out of a corporation's general treasury, it could run the ad
at any time other than the blackout period.2
227. See id. at 2698.
228. Id. at 2688.
229. See id. at 2689-95.
230. See id. at 2688-89.
231. See id. (citing a poll finding that a large portion of Americans think
congressional members cast votes based on their largest contributors).
232. Id. at 2696 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
660 (1990)). Note also that the majority opinion mentions the Austin factor, but it
says that this factor would have no bearing on the ads at issue since they are not
advocacy but rather issue ads. Id. at 2673.







Courts have previously recognized that campaign finance
reform is an issue of special knowledge for Congress and that the
judiciary should afford the legislature due respect in such
decisions by only overruling a promulgated law concerning
campaign finance reform if the law is truly abhorrent to the
Constitution.238 Chief Justice Roberts implied that this was a close
issue to decide. 239 To take him at his word, but still see that he
does not defer to the legislature's special expertise and compelling
interest in fighting corruption, one must conclude that Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. itself is "susceptible of no reasonable
alternative"240 than that it is representative of the Roberts Court's
own unique strain of judicial activism.
Thus, the Roberts Court has effectively returned the country
to the status quo before the BCRA; Justice Souter wryly notes,
"the same toothless 'magic words' criterion of regulable
electioneering that led Congress to enact BCRA in the first place"
has been reinstated.24' By cloaking campaign electioneering in the
sheep's clothing of issue ads, groups can again channel funds
through their general treasuries and thereby avoid the restrictions
applicable to PACs. The Court has inverted reality to create a
convenient truth, reasoning formalistically to overrule precedent
while supposedly upholding the principle of stare decisis. In short,
these election finance loopholes that Congress intended to close
have been teased back open again.
B. The Faulty Logic in Morse
In Morse, the Court ultimately reached an erroneous holding
in the same way that it did in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., by
using a questionable premise to circumvent precedent. In Morse,
the Court determined that Frederick's banner was in-school non-
political speech, and therefore, the requirements articulated by
Tinker did not necessarily apply.242 As such, the Court stressed
the need articulated in Fraser to defer to the interest of schools in
inculcating proper values even if that means censoring student
speech. 24
Chief Justice Roberts attempted to parse the meaning of
238. See id. at 2705 (recognizing Congress's authority to protect the integrity of
elections).
239. See id. at 2669 (referring to "a tie" between speaker and censor).
240. See id. at 2667.
241. Id. at 2702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
242. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007).
243. Id. at 2626.
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"BONG HiTS FOR JESUS" and found two probable
interpretations: an imperative ("do bong hits") or a "celebrat[ion]
of drug use."44 Therefore, he found it reasonable for Principal
Morse to have interpreted it as promoting drug use. 45 While
saying that the banner can be seen as promoting drug use, Roberts
maintained that it was not political speech. Without citing
authority, Roberts asserted that the student himself had not
argued that the banner had a political message and that it was not
political speech. 47
Concededly, Frederick said that his goal was to "get on
television."4 8 But he also noted his interest in asserting his First
Amendment rights and cited the belief that if "you don't use them,
you lose them," as being an important factor in his actions. 219
While he arguably did not have a message regarding a particular
topic-e.g., Christ or marijuana-his actions could be construed as
political because they were a conscious exercise of his political
right to speak freely. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a
banner-traditionally the tool of the political advocate-that
mentions illegal drug use could not somehow be susceptible to an
interpretation as political speech. If Frederick was advocating the
use of marijuana, then that itself could arguably be political
speech, protesting the "war against drugs.""'
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the legalization of
marijuana has been at the forefront of Alaskan politics since the
1970s when the state supreme court decriminalized the possession
of relatively small amounts of the drug for personal use.2 5 1 A
decade before Frederick made his statement, a referendum vote
had recriminalized possession,52 but in 1998, voters approved the
use of marijuana for medicinal purposes."' It would be very
unlikely that a mere four years later the subject of marijuana use
had become entirely moot. At the very least, Frederick's message
could be just as susceptible to being interpreted as a political
statement on drugs as one promoting or celebrating their use. 54





249. Justice Talking, supra note 80, at 6.
250. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 2650 n.8 (citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 501 (Alaska 1975)).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. This interpretation seems especially apt given Frederick's prior history of
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However, again with no authority, Roberts concluded that
Frederick's message was "plainly not a case" of discussion of the
merits of the legalization of marijuana. 5
At the same time that he opined Frederick's banner could be
seen as promoting drugs, Roberts agreed that it could be seen as
silly, nonsensical, or funny."6 But it is unfair to summarily
dismiss a message that is silly as non-political. Dada was a
recognized art movement that promoted the absurd and
incomprehensible, but it was also a forceful statement about the
bleakness of its times.5 7 In contemporary culture, the "pranking"
humor of the kind employed by Frederick cannot be dismissed as
non-political simply because it is silly.
2 58
Roberts also made no principled distinction between
mentioning drug use, advocating its use, and discussing its
legality. Justice Breyer's partial concurrence said as much when
it noted that if Frederick had chosen his words just slightly
differently, i.e., to say "LEGALIZE BONG HiTS," it would have
been construed as political speech and therefore accorded a higher
level of protection.2 59  By erroneously asserting that Frederick's
message was not political or that it was possibly interpreted as
political, the Chief Justice was able to supersede the Warren
Court's Tinker decision in favor of Burger's Fraser. He
distinguished the situation at bar from that in Tinker, where the
Court found that the school attempted to stifle speech just because
it wanted to avoid the problems associated with the free
expression of controversial ideas.2" The danger of Frederick's
"pro-drug" message was more akin to that in Fraser since it was
against school policy and it was also against the school district's
justifiable public interest in deterring drug use among high school
school protest and apparent political astuteness. See supra text accompanying
notes 78-79.
255. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
256. See id. at 2624-25.
257. See Sascha Bru, Dada as Politics, 41 ARCADIA-INT'L J. LITERARY STUD.
296, 298 (2006) ("Dada... manifestly articulated itself with and responded to the.
trauma of the Great War.").
258. See Christine Harold, Pranking Rhetoric: "Culture Jamming" as Media
Activism, 21 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMM. 189, 194 (2004) (differentiating
between parodists, who explicitly employ rhetoric devices as satire, on the one
hand, and pranksters, who are comedians that recognize some situation and "try
something to see what responses they can provoke," on the other).
259. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
260. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(explaining that school officials must show more than discomfort to suppress
expression).
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students.26 1
It was convenient for Justice Roberts to elevate the ideals
protected by the Tinker students over those represented in Morse,
and he did so to further stigmatize Frederick's message as
simultaneously non-political and dangerous. He characterizes
Tinker as a "silent, passive expression of opinion" against the
Vietnam War that posed no threat to school discipline262 but
Frederick's banner as posing a danger "far more serious and
palpable" 21 than that in Tinker because it could be interpreted as
promoting drug use, which the school has an "important[,]
perhaps compelling" interest in deterring.2
However, this view of relative dangers is inapt because it is
retrospective. While the Vietnam War is now looked at with
disfavor and protestors are largely seen as having been correct,
protesting against the war in 1965 was seen by most as
unpatriotic. 265  Had he been on the bench then, Chief Justice
Roberts could have argued that the school district had a
compelling interest in inculcating values that included respect for
the government and its war in Vietnam. He could have also
argued that the protest led to a palpable danger. The Tinker
opinion noted that the protestors were harassed by other students
who supported the war.2 6  This could be said to have easily
escalated into physical violence. Now, in the twenty-first century,
the government is waging a war on drugs, which are characterized
as dangerous and which the school district is said to have a viable
interest in suppressing.6 7 But, what distinguishes Frederick's
silent banner from Tinker's black armbands?26  By dismissing
Frederick's message as non-political with little evidentiary
backing and little explanation, Justice Roberts determined that
261. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
262. Id. at 2626.
263. Id. at 2629.
264. Id. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661
(1995)). Note that Vernonia dealt with Fourth Amendment, not First Amendment,
principles. See supra text accompanying note 69.
265. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the
dominant opinion at the time of Tinker regarded protest against the war as
"unpatriotic, if not treason").
266. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
267. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 (characterizing drugs as dangerous and of
legitimate concern to school adminstrators).
268. Id. at 2651 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that alcohol was banned in his
youth and that drinking "was condemned with the same moral fervor that now
supports the war on drugs," that its illicit use was just as prevalent as
contemporary use of marijuana and, informed by the experience of prohibition, we
should be "wary of dampening speech" advocating the legality of drugs).
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Tinker was not controlling and thereby opened the door for
increased suppression of student speech.
The Court found the logic of Fraser to be persuasive.26' The
Fraser holding, like the main opinion in' Morse, distinguished
Fraser's "obscene" speech as non-political and found that Tinker
did not control the ruling.27° The Morse Court said that the
holding in Fraser that the "[c]onstitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings" was determinative.27 ' The Court deferred
to Principal Morse's judgment that the banner conveyed a
dangerous pro-drug message, which reasonably could be
suppressed.272
Indeed, Justice Roberts went on for a full five paragraphs
about the dangers of drug use by schoolchildren and the need for
schools to prevent drug use, even to the extent of repressing
student speech." ' This is strange given his refusal to defer to
Congress's judgment about the need for campaign finance reform.
By exaggerating the danger of marijuana in Morse but minimizing
the danger of voter apathy and corruption in Wisconsin Right to
Life, Inc., the Roberts Court found it possible to justify deference
to the opinion of a school principal but not to the judgment of the
majority of the members of Congress.
III. Reconciling Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. and Morse:
Focusing on the Spirit of the First Amendment to Avoid
Defeating It in Practice
In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., Justice Roberts stated that
regulation of speech is to be a measure of last resort with "the tie
go[ing] "to the speaker, not the censor."27' The dissent in Morse
rightly noted that this did not appear to be true in the case of
Frederick's banner."' His message was at least as enigmatic as
that in WRTL's issue ads. The majority responded to this criticism
269. See id. at 2627 (majority opinion) (noting that Fraser coexisted with
Tinker).
270. See id. at 2626-27 (asserting that Fraser's speech was within the school
context rather than outside in a political forum).
271. Id. at 2626 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986)).
272. See id. at 2624-25 (agreeing with Principal Morse's inferences about
Frederick's sign).
273. Id. at 2628-29.
274. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007).
275. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 ("[If this were a close case, the tie would have
to go to Frederick's speech, not to the principal's strained reading of his quixotic
message. .. ).
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by reiterating its insistence that Morse was not a case of political
speech and that speech rights are different when exercised by a
student at school.276 One is forced to wonder whether, given all the
contingencies and questionable reasoning in both decisions, this
explanation is not mere evasion. Ultimately, when dealing with
First Amendment free speech issues, should not the tie always go
to the speaker?
There is no tie in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., but arguably
there is in Morse. The meaning of the WRTL ads, properly judged
by McConnell standards, is clear: they advocated against the
election of Senator Feingold.2" Conversely, the message of
Frederick's banner in Morse could constitute a debate on the
merits of drug criminalization, advocacy of free speech, or just
simple silliness. When properly analyzed in terms of context and
intent-and-effect, the meaning of the WRTL ads is much more
clearly advocacy proscribed by the BCRA21 6 than is Frederick's
banner, a pro-drug message.
Morse and Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. are governed by
different precedent, but when speaking of the First Amendment, is
that a viable distinction to excuse these holdings? These two cases
implicate First Amendment free speech concerns, and they should
be treated similarly, or at least in not such a divergent manner.
The tie apparently goes to the speaker only when it suits the
Court's ends.
Even more important, the speaker in Morse was an
individual, not a corporation. Stripped of their special
circumstances (student and corporate political speech), Morse and
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. suggest that corporations can speak
more freely than individuals under the current Supreme Court
First Amendment doctrine. The rights of natural persons, whose
interests include self-realization, should be afforded wider latitude
in keeping with the greater interests at hand. First Amendment
speech protections offered to non-natural entities should be
limited. State-created entities should not have speech rights that
trump those of real people, even if those people are high school
students. The metaphor of "corporation as man" has been
extended to the degree that not only are non-natural speakers
given First Amendment protections on par to those afforded to
individuals, but the fictitious persons' spending of money has come
276. Id. at 2627 n.2.




to represent speech.279 This strained metaphor has led to a
transformation in our understanding of free speech rights-
through each interpretation, a wider and wider net is cast as to
what is protected speech.28 °
The free speech tradition favors more speech since more ideas
mean a greater debate, which is in the public interest. 8' This is
the model that has prevailed in our jurisprudence."' While the
model was tenable when dealing with individuals speaking on
street corners, we now have a situation where political
corporations are afforded the same rights as those individuals, but
are additionally able to spend far more than any one Bolshevik on
a soapbox. The First Amendment has morphed into a shield that
not only protects the individual with an unpopular idea-as it
should vis-a-vis Frederick-but also the moneyed political
corporation in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc." This tradition, which
frames the argument as protection of the rights of the private
sphere against government control is, at best, antiquated. The
policy upon which it rests-opening the door to more speakers-is
subverted in contemporary American Society by using the First
Amendment as a shield.2
Conclusion
Being that political corporations are artificial entities, we
should rightly understand the need to equalize the playing field so
that all speakers, regardless of wealth, are able to speak loudly
enough to be heard.2" The metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas"
strongly suggests that, as in any marketplace, some regulation is
appropriate to avoid monopoly by those with the strongest voices,
279. See Berger, supra note 28, at 969-70 (discussing the relationship between
spending and speech in terms of political campaigns); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and
the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1006 (1976) (discussing the
relationship between campaign financing and the First Amendment).
280. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (1987)
(noting that, despite the First Amendment's relatively limited reach as compared to
substantive due process, more and more activities have been brought under its
umbrella).
281. See Shi-Ling Hsu, supra note 29, at 108-09 (noting that both advocates and
detractors of campaign finance reform appear to endorse the idea "that more speech
is always better").
282. See Fiss, supra note 21, at 1405 (discussing the "Free Speech Tradition").
283. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 262 (1992)
(arguing the First Amendment's aim is to protect self-government).
284. Id.
285. See Fiss, supra note 280, at 788 (suggesting that the state should act to
allow the public to hear voices that would otherwise be stifled).
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286i.e., the most money.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly objected to the notion
that equalization is necessary, or even desirable;..7 in the spirit of
"the more speech, the better," it has overlooked the practical
consequences of its focus on individual autonomy." But
autonomy should not be a means to an end in itself. Rather, it
should serve the purposes famously articulated by Justice
Brennan2 89 and endorsed by the Roberts Court. 9 ' We no longer
have all that many soapbox speakers. 91 Contemporary social
structure is much more complex, and money is obviously of greater
importance in terms of conveying a message.292 By shifting the
view of the government from being a censor of speech to a
protector of speech and by guaranteeing individuals the right to
speak at least as loudly as political corporations, the troublesome
conclusions in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. and Morse could have
been averted.292
For instance, had the Court duly considered its holding in
Austin-that the government has a compelling interest in
controlling the vast corporate wealth that has little connection
with individual speakers 294-it would have recognized that
Congress has the right to control corporate voices, which are
enabled to speak by the simple virtue of having money. Likewise,
had it not so readily dismissed its Tinker standard in Morse, it
would have protected the speech rights of individual students to
air controversial ideas.
Rather than following these narrow tests, it would be most
prudent to look to the end result when analyzing First
Amendment rights: do proposed restrictions on speech further its
fundamental purpose, or do they limit it? A political corporation
286. See J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 636 (1982)
(noting the "truth-producing" capacity is not enhanced by such monopolization).
287. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 113.
288. See Fiss, supra note 21, at 1423; Wright, supra note 286, at 631-32.
289. See Berger, supra note 28, at 965 (discussing the "marketplace of ideas"
concept).
290. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2673-74 (2007).
291. Fiss, supra note 21, at 1409.
292. See Fiss, supra note 21, at 1410; Wright, supra note 286, at 633 (discussing
the impact of the Court's assertion that "money is speech").
293. See Magarian, supra note 22, at 103-04 (discussing the public-private
distinction as important in guaranteeing individuals the autonomy they need to
effectuate their rights).
294. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)
(holding that the state has a sufficiently compelling rationale to support its
restriction on independent expenditures by corporations).
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should not have unfettered speech rights in the political arena:
spending money overwhelms other voices, thereby inhibiting free
speech for those who do not have money. Likewise, the
government should not be able to restrict the free speech of its
citizens, regardless of their age or setting, without a compelling
reason.
